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in Jonas 
 ERNST  WOLFF   University of Pretoria 
 ABSTRACT: This essay aims at clarifying the content of Jonas’s philosophy of respon-
sibility. First, an analysis is given of the connection between nihilism and modern tech-
nology. Jonas’s contribution to the problem of ethics in this context is prepared by an 
interpretation of the way in which fear and the myth respectively function as motiva-
tions for his work. This paves the way to a reconsideration of the content of Jonas’s 
philosophy, whereby two notions of responsibility should be identifi ed: (1) responsi-
bility as ethicity and (2) responsibility as foundational rule. With this distinction 
a number of problematic issues associated with his ethics of responsibility can be 
clarifi ed. 
 RÉSUMÉ: Cet article vise à clarifi er le contenu de la philosophie de la responsabilité 
de Hans Jonas. L’article commence par une analyse du rapport entre le nihilisme et la 
technique moderne. La contribution de Jonas sur cette question éthique doit être située 
par une interprétation de la façon dont la peur et le mythe motivent son travail. Ainsi 
s’ouvre une reconsidération du contenu de la philosophie de Jonas : deux notions de 
responsabilité peuvent être distinguées : (1) la responsabilité comme éthicité et (2) la 
responsabilité comme règle fondatrice. Cette distinction permet de clarifi er un nombre 
de dilemmes associés à son éthique de la responsabilité. 
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 1. Introduction: Nihilism and Modern Technology 
 In the introduction to Part 1 of this essay, 1 I presented Jonas’s philosophical 
problem in the following terms: How does one justify ethics in the face of the 
historically unprecedented developments in the technical extension of the 
human  I can , and the contemporaneous explosion of contingent, culturally spe-
cifi c productions of meaning that are likewise indebted to the multifarious 
manifestations of the human  I can ? Although one could distinguish between 
the problem of nihilism and the vacuum of orientation in respect of the new 
technological condition, the two are intimately linked in the human agent. 
Therefore, if one is capable of giving some sort of orientation in ethics — as 
has been suggested in the fi rst essay by means of Jonas’s myth — technics is 
not merely a special domain of application of ethics; in fact, technics is not 
even primarily this. The principle of ethics itself is the principle called “re-
sponsibility,” in as far as we can ask the question of what the essence of ethics 
in the “technological civilization” is. That is why the ambition of Jonas’s re-
fl ection on ethics is not to apply already existing ethics to a new situation, but 
rather to understand fi rst of all how the new situation has changed the very 
nature of ethics. This new situation is modernity — an epoch that is indissol-
ubly linked to technological progress. 2 The modern technological civilization 
is therefore not only a specifi c domain that is relevant for Jonas’s ethics, it is 
the broadest context that calls for this new ethics. Furthermore, the same mo-
dernity has given birth simultaneously to the modern technical situation and 
the crisis of ethics that has been called the death of God. The answer to the 
question of how to live after the death of God is the same as the answer to the 
question of how to live in the technological civilization. 
 This close link between the technical and ethical situation has not always 
existed in the history of humanity. It is only since the dawn of modernity that 
somebody could declare that we “must, however, refl ect on it [on technics], so 
that we don’t turn it by thoughtlessness into our self-prepared fate” (WpE 26). 
The specifi city of modernity resides in the fact that it is founded on an untenable 
premise — it is untenable because it is possible to show by the very means that 
issue from modernity that the premise is false. This premise is “that there  can be 
limitless progress, because there  is always something new and better to be 
found” (original emphasis) (TME 24). The emergence of this premise has been 
made possible by “an underlying and well-founded theoretical view of the na-
ture of things and of the knowledge of them” (TME 25). At the core of moder-
nity is a vision of the non-human world (I have already shown that this vision 
has induced the idea of the death of God and the concomitant problems for 
ethics). It is a vision of nature, as object of knowledge, which delivers itself to 
an apparently never-ending further exploration (TME 26). However, when 
“technological art therefore follows in the steps of natural science, then it too 
acquires from this source that potential of endlessness for its progressive inno-
vation” (TME 27). In order for this vision of the world to gain ever-increasing 
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sophistication, it has to be allied with technology. In fact, science needs tech-
nology as much as technology needs science, in view of the progress of both. It 
is thus that a relation of mutual feedback between theory and practice emerges 
in which the distinction between the two becomes blurred (TME 27, 29). Theory, 
which was once the road travelled to a fuller life, has become in modernity fi rst 
and foremost a knowledge of things in order to change them (PL 194–195). This 
implies, practically speaking, that science has become technical, in that it is put 
to the service of common interests and needs. Technology, which was once the 
domain of the means to human ends, has come to be regarded as the  telos of 
human existence, or even as the highest good of humanity (TME 30). Its devel-
opment has become the de facto “vocation” of humankind (PV 31). 
 Whereas pre-modern technology tended to be a possession and a condition 
(TME 16) in which the slow changes had nothing to do with a socially institu-
tionalized strive for progress (cf. TME 17–18), modern technics has become a 
fate (TME 21) of progress in which every new success becomes an occasion 
for further progress (TME 19). Often this progress is the result of technical 
answers to problems created by technical progress itself, such as competition 
and demographic growth (TME 22). Jonas’s favourite examples of where this 
leads to is the threat of the destruction of the environment and the possible 
nuclear destruction of Earth, and the manipulation of the ethical agent through 
gene technology (see, for instance, the introduction to PE and TME, PV ch1). 
In this way, the premise of the modern technological age “that there  can be 
limitless progress, because there  is always something new and better to be 
found” (TME 24) also becomes its hidden necessity. 
 It seems then that the “fate” of modern technology is to tend towards the 
invention and application of technologies that pose a threat to the existence of 
human beings and to their existence as agents of responsibility. Jonas attempts 
to make a contribution precisely to a solution of this problem. In Part 1 of this 
article, I tried to show that Jonas’s myth could be used as an alternative point 
of access to his thinking, thus relativizing Jonas’s main philosophical attempt 
to answer this question by means of a foundation of ethics in a metaphysics of 
the organism. The myth does not restore the God that died in modernity, but 
stands under the remembrance of this God’s judgment, as it were. The myth (as 
was also Jonas’s intention with his — failed — metaphysics) presents us with 
a new monism, one that transcends the pan-vitalistic and the materialistic ones, 
as well as the millennial tradition of dualism. It does so by bringing together 
the confl icting elements of life and death in the notion of mortality. Further-
more, it claims a universal validity for the care due to beings suspended tem-
porarily between life and death. Hence Jonas’s defi nition of responsibility: 
“Responsibility is the  care for another being, that is recognized as obligation 
and that in cases of the threat of the vulnerability of that being becomes 
‘concern’ “ (PV 391). 3 Thus every human action, the totality of the human 
 I can , is informed by the mood of the myth (in other words, a reinterpretation of 
Heidegger’s  Sorge ) and is (potentially) directed to objects of concern by fear. 
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 But Jonas is very clear about the fact that he is not interested merely in re-
conceiving the justifi cation and nature of ethics for modernity, but seeks the 
opening of his ideas to a “praxis of the principle of responsibility” (as the sub-
title of  Technik, Medizin und Ethik declares), even to the point of leading to an 
ethical “casuistic” (cf. PV 10 with TME 9). What are the salient characteristics 
of this ethics — of practical responsibility? 
 In order to address this question, the path should be traced forward from the 
myth. I proceed by taking as obtained what I attempted to argue in Part 1 of this 
article, namely the continuity between Jonas’s work, read from the perspective 
of the myth, and its original philosophical intention (despite the big differences 
implied between the non-foundationalist myth and a foundationalist meta-
physics). My programme is to (1) explain the status of the myth as ethical in-
tervention (§2), (2) examine the relation between the myth and Jonas’s two 
notions of fear (§3), (3) examine the ethics of responsibility in its two aspects 
(that is, as a principle of ethics and as practical ethics, respectively) (§4), and 
(4) analyze important interpretational consequences of the above for a reading 
of Jonas’s work on responsibility (§4–§5). Of this programme, §§ 3 to 5 could 
be read independently from the arguments of Part 1 of this article. 
 2. On the Status of Jonas’s Myth as Ethical Intervention 
 To start with, the particularity of the Jonasian myth should be considered: what, 
if indeed anything, distinguishes it from any other tale? To be sure, our descrip-
tion of the myth as an aesthetic event implies that it evokes what in principle 
could be evoked by other means. Making a strict claim to exclusivity is thus 
not implied in the myth; it should be clear that many other narratives could 
claim to take the position of an evocation of the all-encompassing conviction 
of the principle of responsibility; that is, the principle of ethicity as such, in the 
modern technological world. It seems that a valid myth can be recognized by 
some traits about which Jonas speaks. 
 Jonas writes the following concerning the ethical, practical nature of a dis-
course on ethics:
 Still, in the practical philosophy, in ethics, where the matter is the good and its oppo-
site in human affairs, something is added, that makes of the relation the theme of the 
theory and its expression a quite particular relation: the expression becomes  instru-
mental to the realization of that which the theory has demonstrated to be the good or 
what has to be obtained; it is the  beginning of action itself , and therefore no longer, 
as is otherwise the case with the presentation of knowledge, only service to theory, 
but already service to matter expounded in the theory. (WpE 27, my italics). 
 However, this instrumentality is one that should be clearly distinguished from 
the instrumentality of the technical order: “For the sake of human autonomy, 
the dignity that requires that we possess ourselves and that we don’t let our-
selves be possessed by our machines, we have to bring the technological race 
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under  non-technological control ” (TME 52, my italics). This means that the 
instrumentality of ethical discourse is of a second order, in that it could guide 
or steer instrumental, technical events. In this sense it is extra-technological, 
whilst being instrumental. 
 But if this argument appears to make a quite simple point, consider what the 
following statement implies for the freedom of ethical discourse: “The road 
through dualism here briefl y indicated marks the irreversible time-order of the 
two positions, and dualism itself represents so far the most momentous phase 
in the history of thought, whose achievement, however overtaken, can never be 
undone. The discovery of the separate spheres of spirit and matter, which split 
primeval monism asunder, created forever a new theoretical situation” (PL 16). 
If dualism, then, is “irreversible,” if it “can never be undone” and creates a new 
theoretical situation that remains “forever new,” then this implies a certain cap-
tivity of the order of ideas: Jonas himself, in the formulation of his second order 
instrumental discourse on ethics is not only (attempting to) control the tech-
nical milieu, but is being controlled or at least pulled along by the consequences 
of a spiritual event, namely more than two thousand years of dualism. And even 
the new monism Jonas pleads for “cannot undo the polarity” (PL 17). 
 Thus, from these remarks, we can deduce that for any narrative to claim to 
evoke the all-encompassing conviction of the principle of responsibility, (1) it 
has to take as a point of departure the existing state of the human spirit and 
work from there to create something “new” that is, however, under the infl u-
ence of what is old. Furthermore, (2) at the same time, it should be able to elicit 
refl ection to become instrumental to realizing the mentioned responsibility; 
that is, steering the technological order, without becoming simply incorporated 
into the technical, instrumental sphere. 
 The hazard of proposing such a myth is that its author has no choice but to 
place himself or herself in the position of the most advanced point of the un-
folding potential of spirit, and by implication of God, in the history of hu-
manity. 4 This is, of course, an unfolding, not as the creator of a new perspective, 
but as the formulator of, or as a testimony to, what was latently or implicitly 
there, probably since the beginning of the world (this reading would be true to 
the spirit of Jonas’s cosmogonic supposition [ kosmogonische Vermutung — 
PUV ch 10]). One should, however, hasten to add that for Jonas, this history of 
human spiritual unfolding is no “success story” such as he fi nds in Aristotle, 
the Stoics, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hegel, Whitehead, or Teilhard (PUV 244). His 
universal history is one that is written under the pressing realization of the 
risky exploit ( Wagnis ) which the self-renouncing God undertook — risky to 
the point of history’s being capable of producing events such as the horrors of 
Auschwitz (PUV 244). Therefore, the 
 (for us the only known) fi nal, youngest, locally infi nitesimal appearance of the spirit 
in it — in us — is rather to be compared with a lost fl ickering in the most general 
night; and if the spirit was the goal of this gigantic event, one is, in the face of the 
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quantitative disproportion to what was to be obtained (as far as is known to us), 
rather tempted to speak of a big expenditure that was miserably wasted or, perhaps 
kinder, also of a stroke of luck in the coincidence of circumstances, of a play of cos-
mic chance — rather of that sort of thing than of the majestic course of reason 
through the world. The latter is simply out of question. (PUV 242–243) 
 If this is what Jonas believes concerning the appearance of spirit in general on 
the scene of cosmic history, then so much greater the coincidence that cosmic 
history allowed for the formulation of his myth in him. The realization of an 
all-encompassing conviction, expressed in the Jonasian myth, may be only a 
“small fl ickering” in the immense expanse of cosmic time and space, but it is 
nonetheless not an anomaly to be reduced to the rule of “general night”— it is 
the light in which all the obscurity of the world gets its most decisive meaning. 
Bringing to light, allowing to shine the small light that makes ethical judgment 
— responsibility — possible in the modern technological world, this seems 
then to be the fi rst response to the evocation of the possibility of responsibility 
by the myth:  to write the myth as response to the possibility of its validity . 
 3. Myth(s) and Fear(s) in the Philosophy of Responsibility 
 But if we accept that this interpretation of the consequences of Jonas’s myth is 
correct, it is nonetheless diffi cult to see how those consequences fi t in with the 
presentation of the origin of Jonas’s philosophy as he accounts his personal 
thinking experience. At least at fi rst glance, the two approaches to ethics seem 
to be contradictory: the myth as evocation of an all-encompassing context for 
responsibility and written  as response to the possible validity of the  myth ; Jonas’s 
accounts of his development as philosopher  as response to and motivated 
by  fear . Let us first consider the details of the notion that Jonas’s personal 
experience is motivated by fear. 
 Consider fi rst of all, a number of references in the introduction to the  Philo-
sophical Essays of 1974. During the war, for Jonas, the “apocalyptic state of 
things, the threatening collapse of a world, the climatic crisis of civilization, 
the proximity of death, the stark nakedness to which all the issues of life were 
stripped, all these were ground enough to take a new look at the very founda-
tions of our being and to review the principles by which we guide our thinking 
on them” (PE ii); in other words, here it is not the fl ickering of responsibility 
that sheds light on the darkness of war. Instead, the necessity of light is derived 
from the obscurity of night. The dominant position of fear continued after the 
war: “For a while I had no illusions about the power of reason in the gover-
nance of human affairs, I set great store, with old Hobbes, in the wholesome 
power of naked fear; ... one may still give the comforting odds to  fear of the 
vividly imminent extreme” (PE xv, my italics). But then came a turn that once 
again left fear intact: “What recalled me from theoretical detachment to public 
responsibility and set a new task to my philosophizing ... was the growing re-
alization of the inherent dangers of technology as such” (PE xvi). Hence the 
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217309990448
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. KU Leuven Libraries, on 01 Sep 2017 at 06:20:02, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
Responsibility in an Era of Modern Technology and Nihilism  847 
justifi cation of his project of philosophical ethics: “Thus it has come about that 
since the late sixties I fi nd myself — by a transition from ‘theoretical’ to ‘prac-
tical’ reason enforced  by the very pressure of events and even more of the pos-
sibilities colossally looming on the horizon — engaged in questions of ethical 
theory and fi nally in a quest for the foundations of an ethics adequate to the 
matters on which we now or soon have to decide” (PE xvi, my italics). Hence 
also the initial idea to name the collection of essays — which cover work from 
all three phases of his oeuvre — “Man in Crisis” (PE xviii). 
 In  Wissenschaft als persönliches Erlebnis , Jonas’s decision to consecrate his 
research to ethics is justifi ed, and not merely as a logical consequence of the 
philosophy of life: “[I]t is something different, if one arrives at ethics from a 
systematic view or forced by the  shock of reality. By ‘shock’ one thinks evi-
dently fi rstly of the nuclear arms technology. Still, what brought me to ethics 
as remaining life task, was not so much the — after all avoidable — danger of 
sudden atomic Holocaust, than rather the almost unavoidable apparent cumu-
lative effect of our  collective , daily practiced technology, even in its peaceful 
form” (WpE 28, my italics). 5 This spirit is clearly refl ected in the preface to 
 Das Prinzip Verantwortung : “The promise of modern technology has changed 
into a  threat , or that the latter has linked itself indissolubly with the former, 
forms the starting thesis of this book” (PV 7, my italics, not in IR). Hence the 
impatience with which he writes: “[B]oth the limits of life [i.e., the shortness 
of life left to the author — EW], [and] the urgency of the matter” (PV 11, not 
in IR) make him opt to write in German rather than in English, in order to win 
some time. 
 From all the cited biographical accounts, it is evident that Jonas was moti-
vated in the development of his philosophy by fear and not, for instance, by the 
appeal that his myth would make on him. It should be clear that this “shock” 
and “fear” are not the heuristics of fear that Jonas presents to his readers in the 
preface of  Das Prinzip Verantwortung as a “compass” to orient them in a world 
of unheard-of ethical problems created by the dawn of modern technology (PV 
7–8). The fear of Jonas’s biography imposed itself on him; the heuristic repre-
sentation of a possible threatening future scenario, as well as the fearful re-
sponse to it, both have to be obtained or produced actively and refl ectively (PV 
65). The fi rst fear is pathological, the other is a fear of a “spiritual nature,” 
namely “letting yourself be affected” (cf. PV 65/IR 28) 6 . In other words, the 
shock and fear that we learn about from Jonas’s biographical sketches cannot 
be considered the result of a heuristically oriented futurology, but should be 
regarded as an initial impression that initiates both the futurology and the  Prin-
zipienlehre . 
 The heuristics of fear is a creative preparation of suitable ethical conduct on 
the basis of the best available knowledge (PV 62) and comes only  after a fi rst 
fear of which the human being is not the master: “[T]hus the necessary willing-
ness [i.e., the heuristics of fear — EW] can get something very involuntary 
[i.e., the fi rst fear — EW] as help from the things themselves: shock of real and 
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repeated catastrophes of smaller dimensions, that give us the proper fright for 
the big catastrophe, with which the technological excess threatens our future” 
(WpE 44–45). The heuristics of fear is part of the project of justifying the prin-
ciples of ethics and of developing from there an applied ethics. Its execution is 
carried out in obedience to the obligation ( Pfl icht ) that is already based on the 
established principle of responsibility, but all of this seems to be done as a re-
sponse to an  initial fear that is neither necessarily informed by knowledge (as 
the heuristic fear is), nor necessarily informed by the justifi ed principle of 
ethics. 
 Having considered the place and nature of fear in Jonas’s personal develop-
ment, we are now in a position to clarify the question, formulated at the begin-
ning of this section, of the relation between the motivation by the  myth (as 
justifi cation of ethicity as such) and the motivation by an ever-growing  fear (in 
the heart of the individual person; in this case, Hans Jonas) to react to the 
frightening situation of the world (in Jonas’s case this reaction entails the de-
velopment of a philosophy of ethics). To start with, we should distinguish two 
divergent forms of inherent logic according to which the two motivations 
work: (1) whereas (in my reading thereof) the myth provides a narrative evo-
cation of or testimony to the originary but non-foundational source of ethics to 
which Jonas as individual responds in his work, amongst others by his heuris-
tics of fear, (2) his autobiographical portraits clearly put anguish in the centre 
and motivate action from an apprehended catastrophe. Seen in this way, both 
motivations interpret  reality in its confrontation with a  non-real vision: either 
the myth or the projected catastrophes. However, they remain divergent in 
three important ways: 
 1.  The logical point of departure is different: instead of refl ecting on the 
conditions for the possibility of proven acts of responsibility (a refusal to 
repeat Auschwitz; support for caring parenthood) as is done by the myth, 
shocking possibilities are taken to be the primary phenomena that have 
to be explained; instead of ethical human action, terrible events have to 
be understood. Furthermore, the perspective of the myth is directed pri-
marily to the past and present, whereas the perspective of the projected 
catastrophes is directed primarily to the unknown future. 
 2.  The content of this fear, as described by Jonas, differs from the con-
tent of the myth: in the myth, it is true, God takes a risk regarding 
what human beings may do to the divine image, but even Auschwitz 
seems not to have made an end to this dispensation; 7 the events that 
provoked Jonas’s fear, however, threatened to be “even worse,” in the 
sense that they put this dispensation at stake — they opened up the 
possibility of the destruction of humankind itself. One could also say 
that whereas, in the myth, the self-renunciating  God seems to remain 
in the centre of consideration, in the face of fear,  humanity appears to 
be the main concern. 
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 3.  Whereas the myth narrates a general all-encompassing mood, the fear, 
though also an encompassing mood, is directed more specifi cally to 
things about which it fears for the future. The myth throws an equally 
valid light on all phenomena; fear cannot apply to all phenomena equally, 
since it is aimed at particular things or events, even though some of these 
could be very extensive. 
 With this typology in mind, we might consider the possibility that the fear of 
projected catastrophes might also be put into narrative in a myth with a com-
parable aesthetic structure. It would thus also be a myth in the light of which 
the entire reality appears, in particular all human action, but, since it is directed 
at the future, it places the present planning of action in a particular light. This 
light is that of catastrophes of eschatological proportions; if it were to be nar-
rated, it would be a myth of human self-destruction. One could also state that 
 underlying the autobiographical episodes in which Jonas describes his fear 
there is an implicit myth of human self-destruction. This would likewise be a 
“glass through which we darkly see” (PL 261), a “likely imagination” (PL 275) 
or a “supposition” ( Vermutung ) (following the description of myth and its in-
terpretation given in Part 1 of this article). If this is the case, what would be the 
relation between the myth of the self-renunciating God and the myth of escha-
tological human self-destruction? 
 Despite the tension between the two, I propose that the latter myth be seen 
as an extension of the fi rst. The myth of eschatological self-destruction is the 
sequel to and already announced at the end of the myth of the self-renunciating 
God. The two imply one another as question and response. Whereas the fi rst 
contemplates ethicity from the point of view of cosmogony, the second would 
narrate the fate of humanity as the inheritor of God’s risk of self-renunciation. 
The fear of the myth of human self-destruction is only apparently or strategi-
cally anthropocentric, in the same way that the role of humanity is special in 
the entire framework of responsibility (as described in  Das Prinzip Verantwor-
tung ); in essence, however, what is feared in immanent catastrophes is not the 
loss of effective self-preservation of humanity, but rather the destruction of the 
image of God as projected by the doings of humankind. This would not mean 
that humanity is only instrumental to the salvation of God; instead, it means 
that the preservation of humanity is not merely an issue of effi ciency — it is an 
issue of ethics. 
 If this rendering of Jonas’s fi rst fear is accepted, it would follow that this fear 
is to be considered an effect of the shadow of the withdrawn God’s “balance 
sheet” or judgment ( Bilanz — PUV 197) 8 as it falls on the person of Hans Jonas. 
As such it is claimed for the fear that precedes the heuristics of fear and 
that sets Jonas’s ethical response in motion that it is  not merely a numbing, 
pathological fear; instead, it is presented as an exegesis of divine judgment. 
(How one has to distinguish in practice between pathological fear and fear as 
exegesis of divine judgment is not at all clear.) This fear as exegesis is thus the 
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all-important event by which human beings are affected by the ethical. It is the 
very call to responsibility: “To grant that appeal a hearing  is precisely what the 
moral law commands: this law is nothing but the general enjoinder of the call 
of all action-dependent ‘goods’ and of their situation-determined right to just 
 my action” (PV 162/IR 85, cf. also PUV 131). Being able to fear is, in the light 
of the myth, a positive human capability, a sensitivity that constitutes that spe-
cial kind of hearing of which Jonas speaks (and to which I have referred in Part 
1 of the article, §4.1):
 Why may we not, like animals, do  everything that we are capable of? Including 
self-destruction? Since being says so? But as is well known, as all modern Logic and 
Philosophy teach us, it doesn’t say anything at all on this, no “ought” follows from 
any “is.” Now, all depends on the “is.” One has to see it and one has to hear it. What 
we see, embraces the evidence of life and of the spirit [ Geist ] — witnesses against 
the doctrine of a nature that would be foreign to value and to ends. What we hear, is 
the call of the good that is seen, its inherent claim to existence. Our  capability to see 
and hear makes us to beings that are called upon [ Angerufenen ] by its commandment 
of recognition and thus to subjects of an  obligation towards it. (PUV 247) 
 Fear, in this sense, is the being-affected-by, the taking-form or fi rst incarnation 
of the appeal that the valuable being of living things  makes on the subject. 
Hearing the appeal of what is valuable in itself is the fi rst response to it; but this 
response is possible as obedience, as giving heed to it, only in the light of the 
myth. And it is only from this perspective that the original fear is capable of 
leading to a heuristics of fear in which fear is not pathological but a “selfl ess 
fear.” 
 But this fear does not only focus the myth on me as the person who is to 
answer the call of the needy. As registration of the judgment of God, it is a di-
rection of the ethical character of the myth to a particular theme. Fear is fear 
for something that is in need of care or protection. 
 Through this double mythological rereading we have reformulated the justi-
fi cation of the principle of responsibility in a modern technological civiliza-
tion. This corresponds to the fi rst element of the initial three-fold step towards 
the implementation of the principle of ethicity: this step consists of “[1] the 
wake up call of the foundation itself and then [2] the creation of awareness and 
education of feeling, that [3] could proceed from the futurology that is prac-
ticed under the infl uence of it” (PUV 143, cf. also PV 390–393). It is to the 
particulars of this ethics of responsibility that I now want to turn my attention. 
 4. Two Notions of the Principle of Responsibility 
 If fear is the fear for what is in need of care (as I concluded in the preceding 
paragraph), and if the aim of the refl ection on it was to decipher the care in-
scribed in the very fi bre of our human being, then we are just one step away 
from the practice of responsibility, since “[o]nly for the changeable and 
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perishable can one be responsible, for what is threatened by corruption, for the 
mortal in its mortality” (PV 226/IR 125–126). Being responsible for such 
threatened beings, we shall see, fi nds expression in practices such as “the heu-
ristics of fear” and “the pre-eminence of the disaster prophecy” ( Vorrang der 
Unheilsprophezeiung ). However, it would be a frightening error to pass too 
quickly from the justifi cation of responsibility to its practice. The reader will 
notice that thus far the discussion has covered only the justifi cation of respon-
sibility and some of its consequences. A close reading will show that in Jonas 
there are in fact  two philosophies of responsibility . This claim needs to be ex-
plained and argued before the two philosophies of responsibility can be delim-
ited and the question concerning the relation between them can be posed. 
Failure to do so would inevitably jeopardize the entire philosophico-ethical 
enterprise. 
 4.1. The Distinction: Terminological Orientation 
 Although Jonas himself does not make the distinction between his two philos-
ophies of responsibility, we can deduce it quite effi ciently by looking at the 
way the term “ Prinzip ” is used in the book by Jonas that includes this word in 
its title. At the end of chapter 2.III (PV 80–83), Jonas declares that he has 
found the “principle” ( Prinzip ) (PV 81) on the basis of which the “instruc-
tion” ( Vorschrift ) of the decision or verdict ( Entscheidung ) for “disaster prog-
nosis” ( Unheilsprognose ) against “benefi t prognosis” ( Heilsprognose ) can be 
imposed on human action as a moral guide (the instruction would then be the 
pragmatic expression,  pragmatischer Ausdruck , of the principle — PV 81). 
This principle is formulated as “an  unconditional duty for mankind to exist” 
(PV 80/IR 37), which expresses in the indicative the content of the obligation 
that is elsewhere formulated by the categorical imperative: “Act so that the 
effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human 
life on earth” (and the three equivalents thereof, PV 36/IR 11, translation 
modifi ed) (PV 36). Right after having announced that he has found this “prin-
ciple,” he then reformulates it in the following words: “The  foundational rule 9 
 of ethics , from which the instruction [= of the preference for the disaster prog-
nosis — EW] receives its validity, is as follows: the existence or essence of 
the entire human race may never be made a stake in the betting [or risk 
taking] of action” (PV 81, my italics). From the context, it is clear that this 
“foundational rule of ethics” ( ethische Grundsatz ) is the “principle” from 
which the instruction regarding the priority of the disaster prognosis derives 
its validity; in other words,  “principle” is here synonymous with “founda-
tional rule of ethics.” (By stating this, Jonas delivers on his promise that the 
instruction of the priority of the disaster prognosis could “be taken as occa-
sion for a new foundational rule” [PV 70].) However, one page further, Jonas 
concludes the section by explaining that in everything that preceded — that is, 
including his declaration of the discovered principle as foundational rule — it 
had been tacitly presupposed that there is indeed something like human 
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responsibility (PV 82) and that the “principle of responsibility as such — the 
starting point of ethics —  has not yet been demonstrated ” (PV 83/IR 38, my 
italics). 10 In other words, even though the principle-as-foundational-rule has 
been discovered, the principle-as-beginning-of-ethics still has to be found. 
From this it should be concluded that  the principle-as-foundational-rule that 
is the foundation for the instruction ( Vorschrift ) is in turn founded on the 
principle-as-beginning-of-ethics; that is, the principle of responsibility as 
ethicity as such. 
 We thus have to do with a polysemy of the notion “principle” that in turn 
spontaneously leads to a double meaning of the title “ Das Prinzip Verant-
wortung ,” in respect of what the principle of responsibility is. It should be 
noted that this double meaning of the principle of responsibility does  not 
correspond with the double aspect of a theory of responsibility that Jonas 
indicates, namely its objective justifi cation and subjective appropriation (cf. 
PV 163). This non-correspondence is due to the fact that the two notions of 
principle that I have just indicated both fi t into the window of the objective 
justifi cation. 
 This haziness could be clarifi ed in the following manner. The ultimate prin-
ciple of ethicity (which, if it is real as a principle at all, is true and valid inde-
pendent of human recognition — according to Jonas’s understanding of it) that 
carries the name “responsibility” manifests its effect in the fact that tacit recog-
nition is given thereof in the fear that people have for the lives of others (cf. the 
cases of refusal of a repetition of Auschwitz and of neglect in parenthood, as 
used previously) and is  ex post facto justifi ed by a myth (or by metaphysics, if 
one follows the orthodox reading of Jonas, especially of PV chs 3 and 4), by 
means of which an attempt is made to say the unsayable. The myth throws a 
light on the entire human existence and by so doing makes possible an exegesis 
of this fear. This in turn justifi es ethical conduct in general. This justifi cation by 
means of the myth is already a fi rst gesture of response to the obligation in-
scribed in the myth, but the emotion of fear is already an appropriation of that 
ultimate principle of responsibility. Since this appropriation aims at care for 
the other (as that which is valuable in itself), attention should be given to care 
for the other according to justifi able guidelines. The fi rst step toward the iden-
tifi cation of such guidelines is given by the attempt to identify a foundational 
rule or foundational rules that would faithfully translate the concern of the 
myth into the imperative form from which the appropriate guidelines or in-
structions ( Vorschriften ) could be derived. Amongst the series of possible 
foundational rules, Jonas is fi rst and foremost concerned with that of responsi-
bility; namely, that in the current era of history the continued existence of 
humanity should be an all-encompassing duty (for this, see especially PV 
chs 1 and 2). 
 Having identifi ed the two principles of responsibility, we are now in a posi-
tion to distinguish them systematically. From this description, the relation 
between them will also become clearer. 
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 4.2. Main Characteristics of the Principle of Ethicity and the Principle as 
Foundational Rule 
 It should be stated that the ambiguity concerning the principle of responsibility 
is of Jonas’s making (as some of the passages cited below will show). The 
systematic distinction between the two forms of the principle of responsibility 
that follow is not so much based on Jonas’s statements of self-interpretation as 
on what he actually does. I therefore do not claim to be able to accommodate 
every single statement of Jonas on responsibility in my “two responsibilities” 
interpretation, but I do claim that I can do so for the vast majority of them and, 
more importantly, I claim that this interpretation is true to the spirit of Jonas’s 
work and can make a signifi cant contribution to its clarifi cation. Demonstrating 
this claim is the purpose of what follows. 
 A helpful typography of Jonas’s presentation of responsibility has already 
been presented by Micha Werner, 11 and it would be superfl uous to repeat it 
here. What is, however, of great interest to us here is that Werner is mistaken 
in one essential point. Objecting to M. Kettner’s claim that Jonas places re-
sponsibility at the center of ethics, from whence other ethical terminology is to 
derive their meaning, he also states categorically (unlike R.-P. Koschut) that an 
“ ‘identifi cation’ of the ethical with the ‘principle of responsibility’ ‘is ex-
pressly  not intended by Jonas.’ ” 12  As alternative to these errors, Werner insists 
that Jonas does not attempt to present a general ethics, but only an “ethics of 
completion” ( Ergänzungsethik ). 
 My problem with Werner’s polemics resides in the fact that he opposes two 
readings of Jonas’s philosophy of responsibility as if only  one is valid. I would 
claim that  both of these apparently opposing “alternatives” are valid at the 
same time, but are applicable to different levels of Jonas’s philosophy. 13 There 
could be no question about Jonas’s identifi cation of the ethical and the prin-
ciple of responsibility if one accepts that what Jonas calls the “principle of re-
sponsibility as such — the starting point of ethics” (PV 83/IR 38) fi nds its 
philosophical expression in his arguments against nihilism. 14 Although he rec-
ognizes that his metaphysical response to nihilistic scepticism is perhaps with-
out any hope of success (PV 102), Jonas still promises to present it as the basis 
for the answer to Leibniz’s question, “[W]hy is there something rather than 
nothing?,” which he reinterprets as enquiring not about the origin of things, but 
about the reason why things that exist are worthy to be (cf. PV 99). It is his 
arguments in favour of the objectivity of value that aim at affi rming also the 
objective validity of its obligatory nature (cf. PV 102). In other words, the ar-
guments by which Jonas attempts to prove the valid transition from “is” to 
“ought” (especially in PV chs 3 and 4) is a defence of “the beginning of ethics,” 
of the “principle of responsibility” as such, and thus of the ethical as such. 15 
 However, it should be conceded that it is not clear why ethicity as such 
should bear the name “responsibility.” One gets the impression that the struc-
ture of  Das Prinzip Verantwortung by which the content of responsibility is 
presented before its ultimate justifi cation prejudices the reader to accept it; 
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Jonas does not argue for it. If the importance of the philosophy of the organism 
for the principle of ethicity as such is taken into account and if, furthermore, 
one does not forget the Heideggerian inspiration thereof (cf. PL 86, PV 144, 
PUV 14, 25–28), then at least a prima facie case could be made for calling the 
principle of ethicity as such the “principle of  care .” 
 What, then, does responsibility as the principle of ethicity as such consist 
of? For all intents and purposes, it is an a-historical 16 principle. Since it is the 
principle of ethicity as such, it is the timeless (as Jonas presents it: metaphys-
ical) countering of value relativism or nihilism. The manner in which Jonas 
argues for this principle (his natural teleology) makes it clear that it cannot be 
considered a principle of an ethics of the technological civilization exclusively, 
but should be seen as the principle of  all true ethics of all ages. On the other 
hand, it hardly needs justifi cation that the principle of responsibility as a foun-
dational rule is a historically and culturally contingent element of ethics, and 
specifi cally pertinent for the era of advanced technology. The small theory of 
modernization in chapter 1 of  Das Prinzip Verantwortung provides the required 
background thereto. The technical formation of modernity calls for a principle 
of responsibility that is the ethics of a historically unknown kind of human 
being and a specifi c kind of agent for a task that is also created by the modern 
technical condition that has brought forth this new human being by changing 
the nature of human action. In this era, the fact of the far-off and future conse-
quences of actions and the disproportionate relation between (extensive) know-
how and (relatively limited) knowledge concerning consequences should 
supplement former forms of ethics. Because of this newness, this fact needs to 
be central in the refl ection of ethics now. Even if it were to be accepted that 
such an ethics of responsibility did not say much to former generations, Jonas 
would affi rm that they were ethically, caringly responsive to others by other 
means, but on the basis of the same responsibility-as-ethicity. 
 Because of the span of the metaphysical (and  mutatis mutandis also the 
mythical) justifi cation of responsibility as ethicity as such — to show how the 
subject is only the tip of the iceberg (PV 140 17 ) of organic life; in other words, 
to show that the human subject is dependent on a much larger  psyche — it 
should be clear that the “yes” that is part of the very fi bre of life should be the 
principle of all (valid) forms of ethics. It provides a much broader basis or jus-
tifi cation than just what is needed for the historically contingent ethics of re-
sponsibility for which Jonas pleads. Thus the ethicity of the “yes” of life — the 
beginning of ethics — serves to justify many other imperatives and other eth-
ical discourses than just the categorical imperative for “an  unconditional duty 
for mankind to exist” (PV 80/IR 37). Someone might object that this “yes” of 
life is no ethics at all, and that what I, with Jonas, called the beginning of ethics 
or the principle of responsibility as such is a blind force that is at work within 
life in very much the same way as the power of one’s digestive system is. But 
such an objection would fail to appreciate the importance that the reinscription 
of ethics “in the breadth of being”: the reader who thus reduces responsibility 
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to acts of the conscious subject has thereby ignored the monism that Jonas has 
pleaded for so passionately. Such a reader runs the risk of succumbing to 
Jonas’s criticism of contemporary Gnosticism. In fact, one could schematically 
summarize the lesson of chapter 3 of  Das Prinzip Verantwortung as an argu-
ment that it is only because I have a digestive system (as emblematic form of 
my participation in the broader phenomenon of life) that functions as it does 
(life-affi rmingly) that my hammer (as metonymy for the actions of which I as 
agent am capable) can have an aim at all and that on this basis the use of the 
hammer is submitted to ethical judgment. If responsibility-as-ethicity is con-
ceived of as an iceberg, then the life of the responsibly acting subject could be 
compared to another iceberg standing with its tip on the former, and where the 
huge volume of the second iceberg stands for the actions of the subject and 
their historical consequences. The point at which these two icebergs touch is 
actually one point: the thinking, ethical subject. In as far as this subject is to act 
responsibly, its action is built on the small point constituted by the realization 
of the categorical imperative for the obligation to safeguard human life. 
 The inscription of responsibility in ethicity as presented through Jonas’s nat-
ural teleology confronts us with different notions of  individuality and collec-
tivity in responsibility-as-ethicity and in the responsibility-as-foundational-rule. 
In the light of the previous paragraph, we might retort that the  psyche origi-
nally does not belong to any individual subject and that such an entity could 
not constitute an ethical agent. However, the relevant passages 18 should be 
read carefully. Jonas explicitly distinguishes  psyche, which covers the aspect 
of “striving” ( Streben ) and which belongs to “all material formations that have 
a certain form of order” ( aller Stoffverbände gewisser Ordnungsformen — PV 
141, and 142) from subjectivity (as “selfhood,”  Selbstheit — PV 142).  Psyche 
is thus characteristic of all organic life, whereas subjectivity as mutation of 
 psyche is to be found only in the higher organisms and is, as such, a “surface 
phenomenon of nature” ( Oberfl ächenerscheinung der Natur — PV 142). Al-
though Jonas is not eager to be drawn into speculation on it, he concedes the 
possibility of an “unconscious total subject” ( bewußtloses Gesamtsubjekt ) of 
nature, but states that he would “sooner believe in subjectivity without subject, 
that is, in a scattering of germinal appetitive inwardness through myriads of 
 individual particles , than in its initial unity in a metaphysical, all-embracing 
subject... . Distinct ‘units’ of ordered groupings (patterns) of the manifold, 
whether organic or inorganic, would then already be an advanced result, a crys-
tallization as it were, of that scattered ‘aiming,’ and it would carry with it dif-
ference from the surroundings, or individuation” (PV 142/IR 73, my italics). 
To summarize: every human being is, already at the pre-subjective level, gifted 
with an individualised participation in the general fact of “purposefulness” 
( Zielstrebigkeit ) (as seen in the working of the digestive system) that is dis-
persed throughout all of nature. 19 Even if one were to decide (unlike Jonas) 
that there is a collective natural  psyche , Jonas would plead for it to be divided 
into all the different individuals that participate in it (cf. PV 142). 
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 Having established this, how should the notions of collectivity and individ-
uality then be connected to the two respective forms of responsibility (as ethic-
ity and as foundational rule)? The agent of the principle of responsibility as 
ethicity, or rather, the agent that is subjected to the principle of ethicity is  each 
individual human being in as far as he or she as  psyche participates in organic 
life and its teleological structure; every human being is structured in such a 
manner as to be subjected to the affi rmation of life. However, in human beings, 
this  psyche undergoes a particular mutation, or specialization, in the form of 
 Selbstheit , subjectivity, that is capable of acting out interpretations of this pri-
mordial imperative. 20 One form of heeding the primordial affi rmation of life is 
the ethics of responsibility, built on the responsibility-as-foundational rule, the 
bearer of which is  human collectivities (and individuals in cases where such an 
individual responsibility could be derived from the collective one). Hence the 
 paradox of the two principles of responsibility : being rooted in the (possibly) 
collective teleology, every individual organism possesses ethicity as the prin-
ciple of responsibility individually, but the originally individual human subject 
is, fi rst and foremost, collectively responsible. Hence also the  paradox of the 
intuitionist part of Jonas’s ethics of responsibility : human beings in the era of 
modern technology are subject to a collective responsibility, but they appro-
priate that obligation individually through a feeling of responsibility. 
 We could test the claim that ethicity as such applies to the individual before 
the collective, by referring to the fact that Jonas apparently makes this claim of 
the responsibility-as- foundational rule. Consider the interview “Possibilities 
and Limits of Technical Culture” ( Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der technischen 
Kultur ), in which Jonas said about the “ought-question” ( Sollensfrage ):
 I have made an appropriate attempt with the unhelpful means that contemporary 
philosophy (that has exactly renounced metaphysics) offers, to lay a speculative 
foundation for claiming that humanity and hence also every member of humanity, 
thus every single individual, actually has a transcendent or metaphysical obligation 
to assuring that there will be also future human beings, embodiments of this human 
genus, on earth and, to be precise, under living conditions that that would still allow 
for the realization of the idea of the human. (TME 292) 
 To this objection, I would suggest a particular reading of this citation: every 
individual in effect has the metaphysical obligation, yes, but when this obliga-
tion takes — amongst many others — the form of responsibility for the contin-
ued existence of humanity, then it applies in practice fi rst to collectives rather 
than to individuals. This interpretation of mine could be supported by refer-
ence to  Das Prinzip Verantwortung where Jonas says explicitly of the new 
imperative (formulated on the previous page): “It is also evident that the new 
imperative addresses itself to public policy rather than private conduct, which 
is not in the causal dimension to which that imperative applies” (PV 37/IR 12). 
He puts it even more strongly where he asks who the responsible human being 
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is and answers: “Not you or I: it is the aggregate, not the individual doer or 
deed that matters here” (PV 32/IR 9). The pages preceding the citation from the 
interview under discussion can also be used to support my argument, where 
Jonas plainly refers to responsibility as the “responsibility of authorities of 
action [ Handlungsinstanzen ] that are not individual persons any longer, but 
our politico-social unit” (TME 274). That is why the ethical dilemmas of the 
technological civilization are matters for “collective policy” ( kollektive Politik 
— TME 275). He goes on to explain the question of responsibility in this par-
ticular era as follows: “What can ‘ we’ do about it; ‘we’, namely this entire, big 
super-subject that acts as a whole, today’s technical-civilized humanity — 
what can we do bout it [... etc.]?” (TME 275) — the agent of responsibility is 
“we” in this sense. When he asks the question concerning the identity and 
power of the subject of responsibility, Jonas starts by  fi rst acknowledging the 
experience of the anonymity of power in the contemporary technical world 
— what people experience as fate (cf. TME 283) —  before he reminds us that 
every one of us is a  co -agent ( Mithandelnder ) (TME 284). That is why the 
uncompleted task of seizing the power that is needed for truly responsible ac-
tion is found in institutions (that is, mechanisms of collective action) that are 
still to be formed (cf. TME 284). 
 5. Conclusion 
 Having advanced the distinguishing characteristics of this double theory of 
responsibility, in conclusion, the implications of this theory should be outlined 
and refl ected on. 
 5.1. Implications of the Twofold Theory of Responsibility 
 If Jonas argues that responsibility as ethicity impregnates the pre-subjective 
life of the human organism, then it means that he does not make ethicity depen-
dent on reason. Ignorance and competence are categories that simply do not 
apply to this form of responsibility. However, the kind of responsibility re-
quired for the age of advanced technological complexity is one that depends 
intimately on the best knowledge available. In fact, knowledge becomes a key 
part of the duty of responsibility and it strives at doing the impossible, namely 
to bring our understanding of the situation up to the level required by the nature 
of our action (cf. PV 28). The ethics of responsibility are, after all, character-
ized and called for by the disparity between what we are capable of doing and 
our knowledge of the consequence of what we are capable of doing. The im-
portance of advanced, expert knowledge fi nds its expression in the two instruc-
tions of the heuristics of fear (the component of futurology) and of the primacy 
of the disaster prognosis (since the latter can be determined only on the basis 
of expert knowledge). 21 It is of this responsibility then that Jonas says that it is 
“a function of power and knowledge” (PV 222/IR 123). 
 If this is the case, then it seems inevitable to conclude that those who 
have more knowledge and more power to effect changes on the basis of that 
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knowledge are to be considered to be under a heavier load of obligation to re-
sponsibility (but not necessarily to other forms of obligation). I doubt that the 
affi rmation of life — in other words, the principle of ethnicity — could be quan-
tifi ed in a similar fashion. It would probably be safer just to say that it imposes 
a moral obligation on all people. This means that the principle of responsibility 
as ethicity as such is always equally and evenly valid; however, not only is re-
sponsibility as a foundational rule a historically contingent ethics, called for by 
responsibility as ethicity within this particular era of socio-cultural reality, but it 
results in a heuristics of fear that is constantly informed and re-informed by the 
progression of knowledge of our actual world. In other words, whereas respon-
sibility as ethicity has a non-contextual effectiveness, responsibility as founda-
tional rule calls for a hermeneutics of perpetual revision of the situation. 22 
 Who then is the benefi ciary of responsibility in each case? In the case of the 
principle of responsibility as such, it seems to be life. This follows from the 
conviction that teleology as such is good in itself. On the basis of this notion of 
ethicity, it is possible for Jonas to conceive of the possibility of an ethics di-
rected at non-human living beings too (cf. PV 189). Most of his attention, 
though, is directed at responsibility as a foundational rule that applies to hu-
mans. To be more precise, humans as recipients of this responsibility are char-
acterized by two essential characteristics: fi rst, by the fact that they can be 
responsible; second, by the image of humanity. If it is true that being the bearer 
of responsibility is a defi ning characteristic of the human being equal to that of 
the fact of having speech (cf. PV 185), then this holds not only for the agent of 
responsibility, but also for the (future) benefi ciaries of that responsibility. In 
fact, the basic obligation ( Grundpfl icht ) of current agents of responsibility, 
from which all other obligations to future generations are derived, is the obli-
gation to safeguard their capacity to have obligations ascribed to them (cf. PV 
89). 23 That is why the development of “behavioural control” ( Verhaltenskon-
trolle ) is an ethical dilemma: it contains the possibility of threatening capaci-
tating or “enabling care” ( freigebende Fürsorge ) by an incapacitating or 
“pre-empting care” ( entmündigende Fürsorge ) (PV 51/IR 20). It is the capacity 
to be an agent of responsibility (what Jonas calls the “Ebenbild,” “the image 
that is not to be violated” 24 ) for which we should have reverence (PV 392–393/
absent from IR). Whereas the conditions under which the other as potential 
agent of responsibility has become a stake for ethics are historically contin-
gent, it seems to be Jonas’s intention to assert that this image ( Ebenbild ) is to 
be maintained and safeguarded forever. It is, however, a temporal and fragile 
image, since it is only as old as humanity and can be changed or destroyed 
under current technological circumstances. 25 It is precisely the protection of 
this image that is not to be violated (and not only the continued existence of the 
biological species,  Homo sapiens ) that Jonas has in mind in the formulation of 
his categorical imperative: “Act so that the effects of your action are compat-
ible with the permanence of genuine human life on earth” (PV 36/IR 11, trans-
lation modifi ed, my italics). 
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 The deepest principle of an ethics of the future is an ontological idea that 
is capable of bringing forth an obligation (cf. PV 92). This ontological idea is 
that humanity has to exist for humanity to exist well (cf. PV 91). This notion 
implies, in other words, what we already know from Jonas: the affi rmation of 
(human) life that is inscribed in the very fi bre of the life of organisms is the 
principle of ethicity as such (even though Jonas states that this principle, 
being a part of metaphysics, does not form part of ethics as philosophical 
discourse, PV 92). It is only on the basis of such an affi rmation of individual 
or collective life that a foundational rule of responsibility could be formu-
lated which demands “an  unconditional duty for mankind to exist” (PV 80/IR 
37), without this being equal to the “conditional duty of each and every 
human being to exist” (PV 80/IR 37, translation modifi ed). We could accept 
this if, and only if (as Jonas indeed concedes),  this responsibility is to be 
completed by a range of other forms of ethics that are all intended to remain 
equally true to the affi rmation of life, albeit by other means. If this condition 
is not fulfi lled, we would have reason for great concern 26 when Jonas ex-
plains: “Even when in the fateful hour the political leader hazards the whole 
existence of his tribe, his city, his nation, he yet knows that even should they 
be destroyed, mankind and a living world on earth will go on. Only in the 
framework of this overarching supposition is the single hazard, in certain 
extreme cases, morally defensible” (PV 80). It seems permissible and vital to 
infer that it is the co-existence and equal legitimacy of other valid forms of 
ethics (for instance, an ethics of justice) with the ethics of responsibility (that 
is, with the foundational rule of responsibility, but also on the basis of respon-
sibility as ethicity) that could determine when a case is truly “extreme” 
( äußerst ).  Without these other ethics, the individual faces a formidable oppo-
nent in a collective-oriented responsibility and in those who consider them-
selves the elected executors of the ultimate interests of the collective in these 
extreme cases. This collective is always humanity, not the individuals who 
constitute it. 27 It is this particularity of the ethics of responsibility that makes 
the idea of its application to non-symmetrical relations acceptable, without 
anybody’s being able to consider seriously that non-symmetry is a quality of 
all ethical relations. 
 5.2. Transition between the Two Forms of Responsibility and Their Relation 
to Other Ethics 
 The conclusions above enable us to add two further points of clarifi cation to 
Jonas’s philosophy of responsibility, namely on the question of (1) how the two 
forms of responsibility relate to one another and (2) how the two forms of re-
sponsibility relate to other forms of ethics. 
 From the preceding discussion, it follows that the  point of transition from 
the fi rst principle of responsibility as ethicity to responsibility as the ethics 
for the technological era is the specifi c formulation of the new categorical 
imperative: to the side of ethicity it expresses the value of life, in particular 
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the inherent value of humanity, in the form of an imperative that is valid for 
every individual; to the side of responsibility for our era, it makes an appeal 
to collective obedience. Emotion accompanies this transition as the subjec-
tive appropriation of ethics. In fact, it now becomes clear why it was 
necessary to distinguish between two forms of fear. On the one hand, the 
initial fear testifi es to the ethicity of the human being and could only be 
called a “feeling of responsibility” if responsibility is, in this case, equiva-
lent to ethicity as such, since it is a fear without or before the principle of 
responsibility practised in the heuristics of fear. It would probably be clearer 
to call it a “feeling of obligation.” On the other hand, in response to the ini-
tial fear, the categorical imperative of responsibility for the technological era 
is refl ectively identifi ed and then obeyed, amongst other things by a process 
of information acquisition and futurology by means of which the second fear 
is generated in order to mobilize people collectively to cope with contempo-
rary ethical challenges. 
 Furthermore, on the question of the kind of  practical strategies called for 
in responding to these challenges, the articulation of the relation between the 
two philosophies of responsibility also brings some clarifi cation. According 
to Werner, the diverging receptions of Jonas’s work force us to conclude that 
Jonas does not give a clear answer as to the kind of action called for in respon-
sibility or, as Werner presents the dilemma, it is not clear to what politico-
moral subject Jonas’s ethics is primarily addressed. 28 Werner identifi es two 
types of reading or perhaps two extreme readings of Jonas in this regard, 
namely the “individualistic-anarchical” and the “authoritarian-elitist” poles. 
It is, of course, impossible to review all the different readings here. Neverthe-
less, it is important to indicate the manner in which both of these extremes can 
lay claim to some form of support from Jonas: the “individualistic-anarchical” 
reading draws on passages explaining the individual, all-encompassing obli-
gation of responsibility as ethicity itself, whereas the “authoritarian-elitist” 
reading draws on Jonas’s insistence on the collective nature of contemporary 
responsibility and on the need of knowledge, power, and institutions to obey 
its call. Again, I propose that the solution to the dilemma is not to be sought 
in choosing any one of these alternatives, but in correctly situating the two 
readings in respect of one another, since they both contain a moment of truth. 
Both interpretations are valid, but both are valid only partially. The second 
interpretative reading (the “authoritarian-elitist” pole) is clearly supported by 
my exposition of responsibility as obedience to the foundational rule of 
responsibility and therefore requires no further comment. But if it is affi rmed 
that the second reading is compelling, how could the first reading (the 
“individualistic-anarchical” pole), which is clearly in tension with the second, 
claim any validity? This seems to me to be possible only with reference to 
ethicity itself. But how is this possible, if ethicity itself is not an ethics but 
the originary “yes” of life, for life? The “individualistic-anarchical” inter-
pretation could claim validity, perhaps not by claiming that it renders ethicity 
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in an unmediated manner, but by arguing that the ethics of responsibility is 
not exhausted by the foundational rule of responsibility; in other words, by 
affi rming that, in the name of responsibility  as ethicity , a number of forms of 
action may be justifi ed ethically or could lay claim to being responsible (in 
the sense of being true to responsibility as ethicity), even if not all of them 
meet the requirements of the collective responsibility as obedience to the 
foundational rule of responsibility (or even if they contradict or supplement 
what obedience to responsibility as a foundational rule would dictate). I con-
sider it an important task to reread the commentaries that justify this fi rst 
tendency of reading Jonas and to enquire if they do not all  either slip into the 
second interpretation (by recognizing implicitly that the knowledge used for 
the heuristics of fear is actually collective and that hardly any individual ac-
tion could be effective in the face of the challenges to which responsibility is 
to give an adequate response)  or present an ethics that is an ethics of respon-
sibility in the sense that it draws its resources from ethicity as such but in 
practice boils down to a form of ethics other than the responsibility-as-foun-
dational rule. 
 We have seen above that in a number of important test cases (for instance, 
the statesman putting at stake the survival of his country, without endangering 
the survival of humanity), intuition suggests not only that responsibility should 
be considered a fundamental ethical practice (fundamental in the sense of 
keeping ethical agency possible) but also that the logic according to which re-
sponsibility works needs to be disrupted or interrupted by another equally valid 
ethics (for instance, an ethics of justice). Again, it should be stressed that nei-
ther this disrupting ethics nor the responsibility-as-foundational rule can ever 
be ethicity itself, since nobody can claim to be the unmediated spokesperson 
for ethicity as such —  even though we are all ethically constituted by ethicity 
as such, all ethics are mediated interpretations of ethicity . These other pos-
sible, valid forms of ethics are then not simply ethical relics from ancient times 
that remain in force in a technological era that has radically changed ethical 
problems and ethical agency. They are important accompaniments of an ethics 
of responsibility,  without which it seems quite possible that some acts of re-
sponsibility can be questioned as to their fi delity to ethicity . It seems then that 
the question of the relation between responsibility and other forms of ethics is 
not a secondary matter, but rather one that touches on the very heart of the 
philosophy of responsibility. 
 It should thus be considered one of the most important defects of the work of 
Jonas that this question is not properly addressed. This defect is exacerbated by 
the fact that it has been pointed out by numerous authors that the very notion of 
responsibility remains quite narrow, 29 which is one of the sources of the vague-
ness with regard to its application. It is quite possible that the diffi culty that 
Jonas has in developing the casuistic of responsibility that he promised (PV 10, 
67, 68, 77, TME 9) is due to the fact that such a casuistic remains inconceivable 
when other forms of ethics are not taken into account at the same time. 
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 Notes 
 The following abbreviations are used to refer to the works of Jonas in this essay and the 
essay that precedes this one: PL:  The Phenomenon of Life. Toward a Philosophical 
Biology (Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press, 1966); PE:  Philosophical 
Essays: From Ancient Creed to Technological Man (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, 1974); PV:  Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für 
die technologische Zivilisation (Frankfurt-am-Main: Suhrkamp, [1979]1984); 
TME:  Technik, Medizin und Ethik. Zur Praxis des Prinzips Verantwortung 
(Frankfurt-am-Main: Suhrkamp, [1985]1987); WpE:  Wissenschaft als persönli-
ches Erlebnis (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1987) and PUV:  Philoso-
phische Untersuchungen und metaphysische Vermutungen (Frankfurt-am-Main/
Leibzig, 1992). 
 Once again, for the purposes of this study, the books are referred to in the language — 
English or German — in which they fi rst appeared. For  Das Prinzip Verantwor-
tung , I used the translation entitled  The Imperative of Responsibility. In Search of 
an Ethics for the Technological Age (Chicago/London: University of Chicago 
Press, 1984), abbreviated as IR. The page numbers indicated refer fi rst to the page 
in the German text and then to the page in the English translation; for references 
without quotations, the page numbers refer to the German text, where that is the 
original and fi rst publication. 
  1  See Ernst Wolff, “Responsibility in an Era of Modern Technology and Nihilism, 
Part 1. A Non-Foundational Rereading of Jonas,” in  Dialogue 48 (2009): 577–99. 
  2  Modernity is characterized by dynamism (PV 216) and this in turn is due to the 
“‘Selbstbewegung’ der Technik” (PV 404 n. 22). It should be borne in mind that the 
word “progress” as used in this sentence is used fi rst and foremost as a descriptive, 
rather than as an evaluative, term (cf. TME 20). 
  3  My translation (IR) does not appear to contain this passage: “Verantwortung ist die 
als Pfl icht anerkannte  Sorge um ein anderes Sein, die bei Bedrohung seiner Verlet-
zlichkeit zur “Besorgnis” wird.” 
  4  At this point “kommt die Gottheit zur Erfahrung ihrer selbst” (PUV 195). 
  5  See a similar point in  Philosophie. Rückschau und Vorschau am Ende des Jahrhun-
derts (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1993), 31, where Jonas refers to the “warnen-
den Wetterleuchten nahender Krise.” 
  6  Jean Greisch’s elucidation of the kind of fear that is active in Jonas’s work, holds 
only for the fear of the heuristics of fear (what Jonas calls “Furcht geistiger Art”— 
PV 65) and not for the fear that put Jonas’s later philosophical development in 
motion. Greisch explains that it is “exactement l’inverse de la peur “pathologique.” 
Là où la peur pathologique nous  affecte en déclenchant des pensées ou des représen-
tations de panique, dans le cas présent [la peur dans l’heuristique de la peur — EW] 
nous avons affaire à des pensées (ou des représentations) qui sont  à la recherche 
des affects qui incitent à l’action et à la réfl exion,” cf. Jean Greisch, “L’amour du 
monde et le principe responsabilité,” in  La responsabilité. La condition de notre 
humanité. (Paris: Editions Autrement, 1994), 72–89, citation p. 75. It is then the 
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heuristics of fear that identifi es the emotions that testify to the subjective response 
to the other. However, I want to suggest that there is another fear underlying the 
heuristics of fear. 
  7  Jonas’s description of his optimism after the Second World War is in line with this 
idea: “I had returned from the war experience and the nightmare preceding it in an 
optimistic frame of mind as to the condition of the world about to emerge from the 
holocaust. Humanity, so it seemed to me, had passed through a crisis which, at its 
excessive and totally unacceptable price, would still have the effect of a catharsis, 
at least of a calm after the storm. It was the illusion that crushing one supreme evil, 
after it had taken its terrible course, would halt the public power of evil in general, 
if only by sheer exhaustion, for a goodly time to come. Of the better things mankind 
could now turn to I held good hopes — paradoxically derived from the most fright-
ening technological bequest of the war” (PE xv). 
  8  Cited from the myth in the version of the notion of God after Auschwitz essay: “Mit 
dem Erscheinen des Menschen erwachte die Transzendenz zu sich selbst und be-
gleitet hinfort sein Tun mit angehaltenem Atem … sich ihm [dem Menschen — 
EW] fühlbarmachend, ohne doch in die Dynamik des weltlichen Schauplatzes 
einzugreifen: Denn könnte es nicht sein, daß das Transzendente durch Widerschein 
seines Zustandes, wie er fl ackert mit der schwankenden Bilanz menschlichen Tuns, 
Licht und Schatten über die menscliche Landschaft wirft?” (PUV 197). 
  9  Both “Prinzip” and “Grundsatz” can of course be translated by “principle”; my 
decision to render “Grundsatz” with the somewhat clumsy “foundational rule” is 
motivated by the need to distinguish clearly between these two German terms. Fur-
thermore, I refrain from rendering “Grundsatz” as “axiom,” as Jonas and Herr did 
in IR, to avoid the impression that this “rule” is to be accepted without justifi cation 
or that it is supposed by Jonas to be self-evident — Jonas’s point is precisely that 
he intends to provide a justifi cation for it. The translation of the entire citation is my 
own. 
  10  Here, as often in PV, “Menschen” (human beings) means “Menschheit” (humanity), 
since in special cases the “Grundsatz” is not applicable to individuals. 
  11  I take “der Beginn der Ethik” to be equivalent to “das Ethische” (the ethical), or as 
I shall call it here, “ethicity.” 
  12  Micha Werner, “Dimensionen der Verantwortung: Ein Werkstattbericht zur 
Zukunftsethik von Hans Jonas” in  Ethik für die Zukunft. Im Diskurs mit Hans Jonas , ed. 
D. Böhler and I. Hoppe (München: C. H. Beck, 1994), 303–38, here especially 303–12. 
  13  Werner, 313. 
  14  An example of the ambiguous statements made by Jonas is found in PV 9, where he 
describes the historical factors that shift “Verantwortung ins Zentrum der Ethik” (as 
Kettner rightly points out) — this is said of responsibility in practice, which Jonas 
himself (as Werner, “Dimensionen der Verantwortung,”  op. cit. p. 312 correctly 
quotes) typifi es as “Notstandethik,” or “Minimalethik” or “Vermeidungsethik”; in 
other words, responsibility as an “ethics of completion.” 
  15  It might also be useful to recall the wish that Jonas expresses for ethics at the end 
of PL and to which PV is his answer: “[O]nly an ethics which is grounded in the 
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breadth of being … can have signifi cance in the scheme of things. … However far, 
therefore, the ontological quest [in PL — EW] may have carried us outside man, 
into the general theory of being and of life, it did not move away from ethics, but 
searched for its possible foundation” (PL 284). 
  16  The criticism pronounced here against M. Werner also applies (albeit to a lesser 
degree) to Jean Greisch, the French translator of  Das Prinzip Verantwortung , who 
comments as follows on the use of the word “Prinzip” in the title of the book: apart 
from the polemics with Bloch, “[I]l [“the principle”— EW] révèle aussi ses [Jonas’s — 
EW] ambitions véritables: faire de l’idée de responsabilité qui, à première vue n’est 
qu’une vertu parmi d’autres, le fondement même d’une conception inédite de 
l’éthique.”Greisch, “L’amour du monde et le principe responsabilité,”  op. cit. p. 73. 
I do not agree that the principle that Jonas defends is a principle only of the new 
ethics, but of all ethics. 
  17  If the long duration of the cosmos, as portrayed in Jonas’s myth and in his philos-
ophy of the organism, is taken into account, the principle of responsibility could be 
said to be as old as the self-conscience of God in the human being. Hence the de-
scription of this ethics as “a-historical”— it is the same principle of all ethics of 
humanity. 
  18  See also the discussion above — in the fi rst article, §3.2. 
  19  Cf. especially PV ch 3, IV, 3, d, entitled “Der Zweckbegriff jenseits der Subjektiv-
ität: Sinn des Begriffs.” 
  20  See also PV 156–157, where Jonas speaks of “das Interesse in der Intensität der 
Selbstzwecke der Lebewesen selber, in denen der Naturzweck zunehmend subjek-
tiv, das heißt dem jeweiligen Vollzieher als der seine zueigen wird.” An intriguing 
question, which I can only mention here, would be to enquire how Jonas would 
respond to the question of how non-life-affi rming conduct is possible at all. 
  21  This is argued for in Jonas’s Macht oder Ohnmacht der Subjektivität? Das Leib-
Seele-Problem im  Vorfeld des Prinzips Verantwortung. (Frankfurt am Main: Insel 
Verlag, 1981), but added as Appendix to IR. 
  22  However, I affi rm again that it is not possible to include all of Jonas’s statements in 
my categorization. 
  23  Jonas’s instruction of the primacy of the disaster prognosis, in other words, the es-
sential prudence of the philosophy of responsibility, has attracted frequent criticism 
because of its alleged conservatism — cf., for instance, Annemarie Gethmann-Sief-
ert’s “Ethos und metaphysisches Erbe. Zu den Grundlagen von Hans Jonas’ Ethik 
der Verantwortung,” in  Philosophie der Gegenwart, Gegenwart der Philosophie , 
ed. H. Schnädelbach and G. Keil (Hamburg: Junius, 1993), 171–215, especially §2, 
“Der Konservativismus der Verantwortungsethik,” 183ff. The argument underpin-
ning this criticism is that if invention is indeed eliminated by a process of imagina-
tion-induced fear, it would in practice imply a tendency toward the maintenance of 
the status quo. While I do not see anything wrong with the argument on the formal 
level, the picture does, however, change considerably if Jonas’s analysis of the 
modern world, of the “technological civilization,” is taken into consideration. 
This situation is characterized by technological progress as a “calling” and as an 
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omnipresent imperative. If that is the status quo, it would mean that the prudence 
inscribed in Jonas’s heuristics of fear would in effect undermine this ambient 
imperative of technological progress, which is the status quo; it proposes an 
unsettling suggestion of a withholding or regional abolition in a context where the 
continuation of the march of technological progress is the often unexamined rule 
that governs the state of things. It should therefore be considered seriously whether 
his position could not at least equally be described as opposing the status quo as 
revolutionary or liberating. 
  24  Jonas argues that competence does not mean acting on the basis of theory, amongst 
other things, on the basis of the example of Lenin (cf. PV 205). It should strike the 
reader as interesting that Jonas, on this one page, repeats the word “Augenblick” 
fi ve times, for example, “ Theorie aber hatte an dieser Erkenntnis des Augenblicks 
keinen Anteil” (PV 205). This could well be an idea taken over from the early work 
of Heidegger — one should consider the latter’s reinterpretation of Aristotle’s no-
tion of the agent of virtue, who is characterized, amongst other things, by the fact 
that he or she acts “in knowledge” (eidos): Heidegger associates this knowledge-
drivenness of action with circumspection (phronesis~); in other words, acting with 
“ Umsichtigkeit ” that is directed at the particular occasion (kairos~ as Aristotle calls 
it;  Augenblick as Heidegger translates it). See my “Aspects of Technicity in Heide-
gger’s Early Philosophy: Rereading Aristotle’s  Techné and  Hexis ,” in  Research in 
Phenomenology 38, no. 3 (2008): 317–57 (in particular, 345–6). 
 25  Cf. also PV 186: “die Möglichkeit, daß es Verantwortung gebe, ist die allem 
vorausliegende Verantwortung”; PV 92: “Idee von möglichen Täter überhaupt.” 
  26  The term “Ebenbild” is diffi cult to translate — from Jonas’s cryptic notes on it on 
the last page of PV (and absent from IR), it seems that he borrows it from the notion 
in Genesis (humans being created in the image of God), but believes that it also has 
a secular meaning which resides in the idea of humanity that is to be protected by 
the new ethics of responsibility. Hence my translation of “Ebenbild” as “image 
[that is not to be violated].” 
  27  This is in fact what Jonas claims is happening when he speaks of the contemporary 
technically induced phenomenon of “die wachsende Überlegenheit einer Seite der 
menschlichen Natur über alle anderen, und unvermeidlich auf ihre Kosten” (PV 32) 
and of the fact that technology takes a central position in the formation of the “sub-
jektiven menschlichen Zweckleben” (PV 31); in other words, the conduct subject 
to moral judgment. 
  28  As has indeed been expressed, amongst others, by Dietrich Böhler, in “What Can 
the Meaning Be of Responsibility in High-Tech Civilization. A Socratic Discourse-
ethical Perspective,” in  Discursive modernity , ed. N. Gilje and H. Grimen (Oslo: 
Universitetsforlag, 2007), 199–229, and 250–5, here 214, and Richard Wolin, 
 Heidegger’s Children. Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, Hans Jonas, and Herbert Mar-
cuse. (Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), 123–9. 
  29  Jonas admits this implicitly, in my opinion, in his refl ection on the thought experi-
ment seeking to determine whether a child or a valuable work of art is to be saved 
from a burning house (PV 188–189 and 400–401). What is interesting in Jonas’s 
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handling of this dilemma is that neither the “obvious” decision for the life of the 
child (PV 189) nor the more argued defence of this decision (PV 400–401) is made 
with the help of the imperative of responsibility and neither could be reconciled 
with the manner of thinking of Jonas’s imperative of responsibility — in fact, there 
is no trace of the kind of collective, humanity-oriented decision-making that we 
found in the example of the statesman above. But this strange manner of tackling 
the dilemma is an eloquent indication of the importance of complementing the 
principle of responsibility by other ethics. In as far as the Jonasian principle of re-
sponsibility is taken into account  alone , one should fi rst recognize that this dilemma 
has no simple answer before proceeding by using the best possible information (the 
burning house, of course, limits the time available for such an exercise), and then 
to deploy a heuristics of fear to see what, in each of the two possible courses of 
action, the outcome would be if the humanity of the collective of humankind is at 
stake. It may well be that for some ethical agents it is valid to argue and it makes 
more sense to save the artwork. If such a conclusion bothers us — as it clearly 
bothered Jonas — it is only because we are already deploying an ethics of respon-
sibility  in coordination with other forms of ethics in the light of which it becomes 
clearly objectionable to consider saving the work of art rather than the child. One 
could, however, show that it is not absurd at least to consider the way of an ethics 
of responsibility’s concern for humanity, by a slight variation on the thought exper-
iment: suppose we stood in a burning house in 1942 and had to save either a very 
valuable work of art or Adolf Hitler, trapped in a room — which one would we 
choose? 
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